Creationist leader to visit Northern Ireland

Pffffrrt. After watching that windbag Mackay for 18-19 minutes I must say I admire Dawkins' patience and restraint. Anyone who wants to call him a naturalist fundie should realize what enormous patience it takes as a scientist not to start banging your head against the wall or the camera when you have to listen to that drivel being pumped out at you. And continue listening closely during it and try to have a serious discussion about the issues. My FSM.

Mackay: If you can teach the kids how to think, you're miles ahead when teaching them what to think, because then they will be able to think...

Dawkins: We certainly ought to be teaching them to think.

Mackay: Good. Great. Excellent. We agree on one thing.

Dawkins: Well, I'm not sure we really do actually...

Whatever one may think of Mackay, I cannot see what is wrong with the above statement he made. If children are taught how to think, then they can assess for themselves the scientific evidence and the philosophical presuppositions by which that evidence is interpreted. Now, of course, Mackay will inevitably try to teach them his particular theory of origins - but we know that Dawkins does exactly the same thing.

It seems that at least Dawkins agrees that we should be teaching children to think. But then he draws back from actually acknowledging that he and Mackay agree on one thing - namely, that we should teach children to think. I wonder why he drew back from that?

Teaching people to think for themselves is an entirely different issue to the content of what you may wish them to believe. Therefore both creationists and evolutionists should be able to agree on that point. But it seems that Dawkins does not even want to find that common ground with his intellectual opponents. Why?

I would like to suggest that Dawkins only wants children - and adults - to think according to a certain methodology, consistent with the philosophy of naturalism. It seems to me that even the process and discipline of thinking has been hijacked and taken captive by a particular philosophy, which a priori rules out any possibility that empirical evidence could be interpreted according to non-naturalistic explanations. Naturalism becomes a kind of "default position" and the burden of proof is placed on those who argue that certain natural phenomena (such as the complexity, delicacy and intricacy of life) cannot be explained by natural processes alone.

The real battle is not so much a scientific one, but a philosophical and epistemological one. It's a pity Dawkins does not seem to recognise this (or maybe he does, but he is being disingenuous...)
Many people may deride Mackay's views (and I am expecting the usual, predictable comments to follow on this thread), but at least he can see the influence of philosophical presuppositions - and "faith" positions - on both the evolutionary and creationist interpretation of scientific data. So he is certainly right about that.

"philosophical presuppositions by which that evidence is interpreted" Evidence has nothing to do with philosophical presuppositions.
"faith" positions - on both the evolutionary and creationist interpretation of scientific data " There is only evidence, one chooses to accept or ignore the evidence. A group of us, members of [Unsuitable/Broken URL removed by Moderator]discussed this subject and although the majority agreed with the scientific evolutionary evidence some felt the need to hold onto a chosen faith, in my view because like me when at school we were certainly never taught to think of anything other than the religious knowledge belief system.
I envy my friends commitment to their belief system, offering a social bond and to some an inner strength even in the latter stages dying, to other faiths a willingness to be martyrs whilst butchering others. My own view is that I turned out to be that best swimmer in my class of millions and I am grateful for the experience.
Rather like the ambiguous car bumper sticker I bought in America “I don’t know who discovered water, but it certainly wasn’t a fish.” DarwinsChurch.com

#3 - jonathonn -

"Evidence has nothing to do with philosophical presuppositions.... There is only evidence, one chooses to accept or ignore the evidence."

Please show me the evidence that "life could ONLY have arisen by purely natural means" and do it without, in any way, appealing to any kind of philosophical presupposition. I am asking for "pure empirical evidence" that proves this without any shadow of doubt.

Empirical evidence simply shows us what IS. Not how it came to be, or why it came to be. That is a matter for interpretation.

In the much derided book by Michael Denton called "Evolution: A Theory in Crisis" he makes a point which I (an evolutionary skeptic) don't agree with, but which illustrates the point I am trying to make:

"Evolution by natural selection would be established today beyond reasonable doubt, even without empirical evidence of intermediates, if it had been shown that all the great divisions of nature could at least theoretically have been crossed by inventing a really convincing series of hypothetical and fully functional transitional forms."

He then goes on to say that he believes this has never been achieved, but that is not the point I want to make. Even if such convincing hypothetical transitional forms had been described accurately, that still does not "prove" anything. He is saying that "evolution by natural selection" would be established "beyond reasonable doubt". But that statement is based on the assumption that if we could hypothesise that life COULD HAVE arisen by evolution by natural selection, then it DID.

But the statement: "If something could have happened, therefore it did" is a non sequitur. Many things "could" have happened in the past that clearly did not happen. It is an absurd assumption.

It is only possible to hold to that belief as an interpretation of the empirical evidence - in other words, it is a "faith" position. And interpretations are based on philosophical presuppositions - in this case, the presupposition of naturalism, and the rejection of any reality (particularly intelligent reality) outside nature.

In fact, as a Christian, I could use exactly the same logic as the naturalists: "If God could exist, therefore he does." If such a proposition is derided, then so should the naturalistic proposition be derided.

Those who claim to believe in reason and logic can't have it both ways!

Received your mail and forwarded the correction do not mind which version you include.
"philosophical presuppositions by which that evidence is interpreted" Evidence has nothing to do with philosophical presuppositions.
"faith" positions - on both the evolutionary and creationist interpretation of scientific data " There is only evidence, one chooses to accept or ignore the evidence. A group of us, members of https://www.pensioners.co.uk/ privately discussed this subject and although the majority agreed with the scientific evolutionary evidence some felt the need to hold onto a chosen faith, in my view because like me when at school we were certainly never taught to think of anything other than the religious knowledge belief system.
I envy my friends commitment to their belief system, offering a social bond and to some an inner strength even in the latter stages dying, to other faiths a willingness to be martyrs whilst butchering others. My own view is that I turned out to be that best swimmer in my class of millions and I am grateful for the experience.
Rather like the ambiguous car bumper sticker I bought in America “I don’t know who discovered water, but it certainly wasn’t a fish.” [Unsuitable/Broken URL removed by Moderator]

@LSV

Let me get this straight. A book questioning the validity of the modern theory of evolution has within it some assertion that the theory could be somehow "proved" by making stuff up. This assertion is then assumed to apply to "the naturalists" in order to show that they are wrong. Priceless.

logica_sine_vanitate

Well I have to grudgingly admit that after great debate my friend Harvey agrees with you entirely, others might be sceptical but I know that you will believe that although Harvey takes the physical shape of a large rabbit and is always with me he truly does exist and is the font of all wisdom.
My DNA is of little consequence, Harvey can recast knowledge as justified true belief, some truths may be justified and true, yet fail to count as knowledge even probabilities are but responses to Gettier. "If God could exist, therefore he does" absurd assumption of course not.

#6 - grokesx -

I can see that you obviously didn't make much effort to try to understand what I wrote.

I was making the point - and just happened to quote from that particular book - that constructing a hypothesis to justify evolution by natural selection (which is what is necessary, unless you know of a way of providing the empirical evidence for all the transitional forms between species - and prove that they are indeed transitional forms) does not prove that evolution by natural selection occurred.

My post was a response to the assertion that there is no place for interpretation in the discussion concerning the theory of evolution - that somehow this idea rests on "evidence" that stands above any kind of philosophical interpretation. As I have shown, this belief (that there is no interpretation involved) is complete and utter nonsense, but is a view continually perpetrated by naturalists, who seem to be confused as to the distinction between science and philosophy.

If you can prove my points wrong on the basis of logic (rather than emotion), then I would be most interested.

"I can see that you obviously didn't make much effort to try to understand what I wrote."
True. But I know a big fat straw man when I see one. If you can point to any serious exposition of the "If we could hypothesise that life COULD HAVE arisen by evolution by natural selection, then it DID" argument (hint "Evolution: A Theory in Crisis" doesn't count), I'd be ready, both emotionally and logically, to look into your rebuttal of it.
In the mean time, as an "evolutionary skeptic", you might want to lose the obsession with proving stuff and take some time to understand the theory (well, any scientific theory come to that). When you've done that and appraised the evidence (if you can't quite bring yourself to chuck Dawkins a few quid for his latest, Jerry Coyne's "Why Evolution is True" is a good place to start) and you still count yourself a skeptic, you could get qualiified and do some research, a Nobel prize surely awaits.
Or you could go fossil hunting for a precambrian rabbit.

#9 - grokesx -

"If you can point to any serious exposition of the "If we could hypothesise that life COULD HAVE arisen by evolution by natural selection, then it DID" argument (hint "Evolution: A Theory in Crisis" doesn't count), I'd be ready, both emotionally and logically, to look into your rebuttal of it."

I think you will find that any exposition of evolution has to proceed on this premise (if that were not the case, then evolutionists would not be so dogmatic about their theory). The very fact that this theory (which can only ever be a theory, since we cannot observe what occurred before the dawn of recorded human history) is promoted as "fact", proves my point. There is a process of thinking that goes from "this could have happened" to "therefore we now know that it did". The fact that you encourage me to read a book called "Why Evolution is True" rather supports my contention!

And I repeat... are you suggesting that if transitional forms are not reconstructed hypotheses, then they have all been discovered empirically? If every conceivable transitional form has not been discovered empirically (e.g. as fossils), then Michael Denton's point is perfectly valid (but, of course, since he is criticising your pet theory of evolution, you simply a priori dismiss his views - oh, what a brave new world of intellectual honesty and rigour we live in!!).

I am concerned about the way people think. I am not interested in fundamentalist dogma, whether promoted by the secular or religious inquisition (and the secular inquisition seems to be gaining the ascendancy at the moment - so much for "free thinking"!!).

My argument may be a "straw man" for you. But, hey, anyone can write the words "s-t-r-a-w m-a-n". Look, I've just done it! It's quite another matter to be able to show logically that someone's argument actually is a "straw man".

"My argument may be a "straw man" for you. But, hey, anyone can write the words "s-t-r-a-w m-a-n". Look, I've just done it! It's quite another matter to be able to show logically that someone's argument actually is a 'straw man'."

Well, strictly speaking, you may be justified in protesting at the straw man characterization. Normally the accusation is made if the argument presented is a caricature or misrepresentation of an actual one. The one you are so keen to rebut comes completely from inside your own head. Still, it's an argument you can't lose, so I won't knock it.

Seriously, if you can't be bothered to learn anything about theories and evidence before wittering on, you will come across as supremely ignorant, no matter how many "empiricals", "methodologies" and
"epistemologicals" you litter your posts with.

So we should we assume the uniformity of nature?

Anybody any idea?

"why should we"

#11 - grokesx -

a: A THEORY about origins: "we believe that this is what could have happened"

b: A FACT about origins: "we know that this did happen"

Do you dispute those statements? And if so, why?

And how do we get from "a" to "b" (without the help of any philosophical assumptions or "leap of faith")?

Explain please.

And after you have successfully silenced me with sound logic and evidence, then you have earned the right to be dismissive towards me, and not before...

Bernards_Insight
Aristotelian teleology

logica_sine_vanitate
"successfully silenced me" I for one would not wish to. However most of what you say contradicts what would seem to be your belief system (faith)If you do not have one then "Great" I would then understand your comments and conversely, then I understand your angst & so does Harvey

"And after you have successfully silenced me with sound logic and evidence, then you have earned the right to be dismissive towards me, and not before.."

Well, like John Mackay, it is unlikely you will be silenced this side of the grave, but that is by the by.

In science, you don't tend to go from your a) to b). You start with b, your facts, and then come up with your theory (by way of a number of connected hypotheses) that explains those facts. To be a proper theory, it needs not only to explain your facts, but be falsifiable (Cambrian rabbits for eg) and make predictions which can then be tested by experiment. If the predictions are correct, your theory is strengthened, if not, it needs to be modified to account for the the new information, or junked altogether and a revolution in the field begun. At the dawn of the 20th Century, classical physics encountered just such a revolution with Relativity and Quantum Theory. It's not over yet, of course.

If your theory stands, unfalsified, but refined with new evidence, predictions and experiments for - for the sake of argument - 150 years or so, it is pretty strong and unlikely to be replaced by something totally at odds with it. It will never be proved, because that is a meaningless concept outside of maths and the fond imaginings of philosophers, sorry, the formal sciences and philosophy.

With evolution, great confusion arises out of the notions of what is fact, what is theory and the sometimes deliberate mangling of the definition of the word theory as a synonym for "guess", which is one reason why I recommended reading up on the subject. Facts include the genetic similarities of all living things - from banana to bonobo - the fossil record and direct observation of descent with modification in bacteria, fruit flies, even guppies and lizards.

The theory part, the modern evolutionary synthesis, the modified and extended theory that began with Darwin, is the current best explanation of the facts and will change over time, not due to leaps of faith or philosophical wibbling, but due to observation, prediction, experiment and evidence.

Regalwanda;

I'm not sure I understand. Why does Aristotelian teleology explain why we should assume that nature is uniform? It presupposes that fact, surely?

A good general post in #3 on how science works, grokesx. Thanks.

"it presupposes that fact, surely?" The very point.
That's it for me enjoyed the comments, learnt lot of new words but need some reality now so will look at some illicit images online whilst Harvey reads up on Navya-Nyaya fallibilism
grokesx
Edge Foundation is the best for the intellectual and social achievement of society :}

#19 regalWanda

Thanks for the heads up.

Hahaha, thanks very much folks.

It's been...enlightening.

#16 - grokesx -

Thank you for your response.

My point (b) - "fact" - is describing a claim which is asserted to be factual concerning something that happened in the past, which, for obvious reasons, could not have been observed. It appears that your concept of "fact" concerns what can be empirically observed in nature today. There is still a problem in extrapolating from current observations to reconstructions of events from the distant past. What are the presuppositions which enable these reconstructions to be made?

For example, you argue that genetic similarities are evidence of the grand theory of macro-evolution. A creationist could just as easily say that genetic similarities are due to the fact that creatures have been created to operate in the same or similar ecosystems, therefore some similarity is necessary. I am not saying here that that is true. All I am saying is that the "fact" of genetic similarities has been "interpreted" according to a particular philosophy, namely, naturalism, because the alternative "intelligent design" theory is ruled to be "unscientific" (although the adjectives "anti-naturalist" and "unscientific" are not synonyms, although they may appear to be to some people). This interpretation is the result of a philosophical decision.

I am well aware that you may scorn that view, but it is perfectly logical.

As a matter of fact, even though I am an "evolutionary skeptic", I am not actually attacking the theory of evolution in this thread. All I have been saying is that philosophical assumptions are part of that theory, and have to be.

This goes back to the point Mackay was making. Whether one derides his creationist view or not, he is right is saying that there is a "faith" (or "philosophical assumption") issue involved in the construction of the theory of evolution.

You may not have much time for philosophy, but anyone who claims to be "rational" and champions logic, evidence and knowledge, has to respect the way we think. This is what philosophy - and more particularly, epistemology - is about.

I wish you well, and thanks for the discussion.

I am surprised the Professor lasted as long as he did in this discussion, he doesn't usually debate creationist. There isn't much point, evidently. How a belief that there is no god can be religion is hard for me to fathom.

I would like to point out that there is a wide consensus and growing agreement among scientist that the term should be the "Law of Evolution" because of the overwhelming evidence for it.

Oh and were do I get myself one of those darwinschurch stickers?

Not really wanting to get involved in this one, team, but LSV writes:

There is still a problem in extrapolating from current observations to reconstructions of events from the distant past.

Of course it is a problem; you face that problem every day; light that strikes your retina left its source some time ago; you extrapolate. You never really observe anything - you just perceive the effects, and fill in the blanks. What we CAN do is create (consciously or unconsciously) MODELS to explain the incoming data; whether those data are from millions of years ago or nanoseconds ago is actually immaterial.

Insofar as the word "fact" has any meaning, evolution is a fact.

For example, you argue that genetic similarities are evidence of the grand theory of macro-evolution. A creationist could just as easily say that genetic similarities are due to the fact that creatures have been created to operate in the same or similar ecosystems, therefore some similarity is necessary. I am not saying here that that is true.

Good, because the creationist response does not explain these similarities. The similarities are only explicable by common descent; *convergent* evolution can produce similar adaptations, but does NOT produce the hierarchical clustering of genetic similarities that we observe. Similarly "common design" does not produce this clustering, unless the clustering itself is intentionally (and inexplicably) produced. So your objection in this instance actually *fails*. The fact is that you do not have an adequate counter-explanation. That is a fact too, incidentally.

All I am saying is that the "fact" of genetic similarities has been "interpreted" according to a particular philosophy, namely, naturalism, because the alternative "intelligent design" theory is ruled to be "unscientific"

Quite incorrect. As I mentioned above, so-called "intelligent design" does not explain the nature of these similarities. It FAILS, regardless of our philosophical presuppositions. You could propose theistic evolution, I suppose, but that doesn't really help either - you have accepted common descent at any rate.

As a matter of fact, even though I am an "evolutionary skeptic", I am not actually attacking the theory of evolution in this thread. All I have been saying is that philosophical assumptions are part of that theory, and have to be.

It helps to minimise these and keep them sensible, though. Time for your shave, Mr Ockham?

anyone who claims to be "rational" and champions logic, evidence and knowledge, has to respect the way we think. This is what philosophy - and more particularly, epistemology - is about.

And anyone who makes a pretence at the philosophy of science, or indeed of epistemology, has to recognise that *some* of the ways philosophers think are deeply unsound when applied outside their terms of reference. They would do well to realise that what is sauce for the goose is frequently sauce for the gander, and by loftily making pronouncements on science, they often cut off the limb on which they are perched.

Need to up your game, LSV ;-)

"It appears that your concept of "fact" concerns what can be empirically observed in nature..."

Not really, although the examples I gave were of that kind. A fact does not have to be the absolute certainty demanded by many philosophers. As Stephen J Gould had it, "In science, 'fact' can only mean 'confirmed to such a degree that it would be perverse to withhold provisional assent.' I suppose that apples might start to rise tomorrow, but the possibility does not merit equal time in physics classrooms.'"

"...today."

Mackay, for his own reasons, is particularly hung up on the time thing. But there are many things in science that he doesn't appear to dispute as fact that are also impossible to observe directly. Qualified in geology, he would probably be well aware that the chunks of rock he worked with were comprised mainly of empty space, but I think it is a fair bet that he didn't spend long nights arguing the toss about how his fellow students in the physics and chemistry departments could be so sure of this so called "fact".

"For example, you argue that genetic similarities are evidence of the grand theory of macro-evolution. A creationist could just as easily say that genetic similarities are due to the fact that creatures have been created to operate in the same or similar ecosystems, therefore some similarity is necessary. I am not saying here that that is true."

They do argue such things and many more things besides, but they have got a lot of heavy lifting to do to justify the arguments. It is a small matter to do some hand waving and say the speed of light could have been different 6,000 years ago, that radioactive half lives were not necessarily the same then as they are now and that the idea of the uniformity of nature is wrong. As I my have mentioned before, there are Nobel prizes for the taking if any one of these things could be supported by evidence, but don't hold your breath.

"All I am saying is that the "fact" of genetic similarities has been "interpreted" according to a particular philosophy, namely, naturalism, because the alternative "intelligent design" theory is ruled to be "unscientific" (although the adjectives "anti-naturalist" and "unscientific" are not synonyms, although they may appear to be to some people). This interpretation is the result of a philosophical decision.

There's a lot to go at here, but I'll briefly mention the point that you don't seem to appreciate the difference between methodological naturalism and ontological naturalism. Also, intelligent design theory is ruled to be unscientific because it has no evidence to support it and there is no way to falsify it, not because of philosophical objections. The sciency seeming part of it, the "irreducible complexity" of blood clotting, the eye and flagella have been shown to be perfectly reducible.

@Heliopolitan

Nice post, but more importantly, you can use HTML tags here?Yay.

"Also, intelligent design theory is ruled to be unscientific because it has no evidence to support it and there is no way to falsify it, not because of philosophical objections. The sciency seeming part of it, the "irreducible complexity" of blood clotting, the eye and flagella have been shown to be perfectly reducible."

And even if they weren't, it was shown that the scaffolding mechanism can account for what are termed irreducibly complex systems through evolution. That works not by 'building up' but by 'trimming down' a system through gradual steps.

The ID creationists had as usual done it breathtakingly wrong. They had come up with the analogy of a Roman arch spanning a chasm as an irreducibly complex system. After all, they reasoned, if you take one stone out of it, the whole thing collapses, so each piece only has a useful function if all the other pieces are there. Pretty much Behe's idea of irreducible complexity. But by holding up that analogy they had killed their own case.

Behe and his fellow cretinists should have realized of course that an arch is not popped into existence all at once. You can fill up the chasm stone by stone (i.e. gradually, in small steps) then place the arch stones in place one by one on top of those stones, then pull away the stones under the arch stones one by one. The arch would then have been completed through a series of small gradual steps, yet it would form what Behe et al gave as an example of an irreducibly complex system.

In biology the same can happen. A large system can build up through small steps, then lose parts through small steps, and only after this 'trimming down' does each part become vital. Showing that the examples of blood clotting, the immune system and the bacterial flagellum were not irreducibly complex was important for winning the Dover trial. But someone should also have thought of bringing up the scaffolding mechanism back then (and I think there are some more mechanisms available to achieve the same) as it is arguably a more powerful argument against irreducible comlexity. Showing that examples of irreducibly complex systems were not irreducibly complex is one way to remove an objection to evolution. But the scaffolding mechanism shows that even if a system was found that adheres to Behe's definition of irreducible complexity, it could still have arisen through evolution.

Yes, yes, but why do we assume the uniformity of nature?

I'm still waiting on an advance on "aristotelian teleology", which didn't really cut it as a reply.

Actually, while we're here, why is there something and not nothing?

Hello Bernard,

"Actually, while we're here, why is there something and not nothing?"

Beats me. For now. Maybe physicists and astronomers will find the answer one day. Although I would not necessarily estimate the chances of that any higher than the chances of scientists one day fully uncovering the secret of consciousness.

Finding the answer to your question is work in progress, with no guarantee that the answer will definitely be found.

Still, that is no reason to make up an answer that doesn't explain anything at all (like your favourite words combination for that, 'god' and 'transcendent') and merely kills off the curiosity to investigate further.

Peter;

What you're forgetting is that, as in algebra, and, indeed, experimental science, knowing something of the question tells us something about what kind of answer would suffice.

To ask "why am i here?" is already to know that the answer cannot be "because I have blue eyes"

Similarly, to ask, "why is there something rather than nothing?" is already to know that the answer can't lie in a physical process. After all, it's the physical process that we're asking about.

Thus, although it is reasonable to hold that we don't know the answer, it is also reasonable to hold that, whatever the answer is, it won't be reduced to the physical phenomena.

So, although you might think I'm "making up an answer", what I'm actually doing is taking what I know of the question to infer what little I can about the answer.

I'm certainly not killing of any curiosity...I am, however, directing it to where the question leads.

Hope that makes sense to you.

Hello Bernard,

"Similarly, to ask, "why is there something rather than nothing?" is already to know that the answer can't lie in a physical process. After all, it's the physical process that we're asking about."

This reminds me of one of your posts on the god and science thread. You initially dismissed some of my arguments about how we are learning about consciousness since they would only ever tell us about what you called the 'affected', the consciousness that was already there. But later you did agree that it could not be ruled out that consciousness could arise purely from physical processes. It seems you're putting forward analogous reasoning here, with the origin of the universe taking the place of consciousness.

I would agree with you to the point that the answer wouldn't lie in common, everyday physical processes we see around us. But then if science ever were to uncover the origins of our universe, I wouldn't expect it to come from the stuff we see as we travel to/from work, the physical laws that determine the planets, stars etc.

greets,
Peter

Yes, yes, but why do we assume the uniformity of nature?

Why not? You do it all the time. For instance, you assumed, whether you aknowledge it or not, that the electrons in the semiconductors in your computer (plus all the ones in all the servers involved in the process of you going onto the net and coming here, virtually speaking) were going to behave in the same weird - but understandable to those people familiar with quantum mechanics - way they behaved last time you were here.

Every time you get out of bed in the morning you assume that gravity will work the same way it did yesterday. I could go boringly on forever (I often do) but you get the picture. If we don't, in our everyday life, assume the uniformity of nature, we would be like a supercharged version of the Catherine Tate character who is constantly startled by normal things.

So it makes sense to assume it until we come across a good reason not to. For lots of us, that something would need to be something more compelling than counting up the begattings in a book written by a tribe of desert nomads 4000 years ago.

Peter;

It is false and misleading to make an analogy between the universe and consciousness.

First, I don't think I ever ruled out that consciousness could "arise" from physical processes. What I always said was that, even if it did, that didn't mean it itself was a physical process.

Secondly, the argument I'm making now is in no way analogous to that which you think I made previously - although, as I have pointed out, I never actually made such an argument.

The universe can't arise from physical processes because it INCLUDES all physical processes.

Physics can't account for there being physics.

To get back to my initial question some posts back, "why is there something rather than nothing"?

You cannot say "there is a universe because a (as yet unknown) physical process determined that there be a universe" because physical processes, even when we don't yet know them, are part of what is included in "universe". they are an instance of the "something" rather than "nothing" that we asked about in the first place.

Unless this as yet unknown physical process were entirely self-sufficient, totally unreliant and independent of any other physical process, it cannot be the answer to the question "why is there something rather than nothing?".

On the other hand, if this as-yet-unknown physical process that isn't part of the universe but accounts for the universe is totally self-sufficient and unconnected to any other physical process, I'm not sure what grounds we might have for hypothetically saying that it was a physical process at all.

Seems to me that a "fundamental act or existence-through-which" would be a better use of language for such a, hypothetical, thing.

Grokesky, I'm afraid you miss the point.

I suppose I phrased my question wrong, but I think it was just how it came up. When I asked "why do we assume the uniformity of nature" I didn't mean that we SHOULDN'T assume it.

It makes sense to assume it, as it seems to be the case, as everything works accordingly.

I meant "why do we assume that that's the case without asking why it's the case"?

Usually when things work in a patterned way we ask for a reason behind that pattern. Sometimes the reasoning lies behind a mind that creates the pattern, sometimes the pattern is actually created wholly by the mind that perceives it.

Why is nature uniform and regular, and why does it work according to laws?

Now, obviously you can't invoke a law, real or hypothetical, to answer that.

Are the laws and regularity of experience simply constructs of the mind or is there a regular nature outside of the mind?

Hmmm?

Laters.

I meant "why do we assume that that's the case without asking why it's the case"?

If you have kids you may remember the endless flows of why. Usually children will carry on long after they can grasp the concepts in the answers and it is obvious that the whys are serving some purpose other than satisfying curious minds. Similarly, many people who come up with questions like yours, and I've talked to a few, aren't interested in the answers, but are simply directing conversations down well worn paths, usually with a god at the end.

Those few, of which you may be one, who are not doing this are unfortunately living in the wrong century. Before Francis Bacon's time (I know I'm wildly simplifying things here, but hey ho) all the brightest people could be found arguing the toss about the deepest questions of theology and philosophy, happily disappearing up their own intellectual fundaments and having a whale of a time. Since then, the best bit of philosophy, the generating of ideas through inductive reasoning, has been incorporated into the scientific method (I'm sure you don't need me to go through it all again) and the rest of it, the sitting down and thinking really hard about stuff and coming up with pointless wibblings often as not have been left to those who are that way inclined.

Have fun with that, if you like, but if your question(s) will ever be answered, I'd wager it will be by the slow, stepwise processes of science.

McKay was in Northern Ireland on his last visit , and didn't he manage to gain entry to a school as well ?

Still, we seem to be inundated with these high profile YEC speakers now. Paul Taylor (head speaker with AiG) was here last month, Philip Bell (CEO of CMI Europe) is here at the moment. Did anyone manage to get along to the meeting at QUB today ? After avoiding the provonce for many years he now seems to be a seasoned regular. I wonder why ?

Actually, while we're here, why is there something and not nothing?

Maybe it's all a dream Bernard, you know, like the matrix and all that dreamworld skepticism. I've met people who actually think like this

Perhaps it is, Peter.

Grokesx, for example, seems content not only to simply forget about the questions, but to denigrate anyone who continues asking the really interesting questions about reality. He is content simply to assume and never doubt the really hard questions.

He then makes a wager with astronomical odds, given the inherent unsuitability of science to explain why there is a science. I'd wager, with much better odds, that, even though there may never be a full, all encompassing, rational answer, the questions allows us to discount an answer that the universe exists because it is bound by laws. Such an answer is inherently non-sensical, but some seem content to make the wager anyway.


Personally, I'm more interested in the big questions than the particular questions about one particular branch of empirical science. But some people are content to stay in their empirical bubble, happy enough to assert that there will never be answers, so why bother trying.

Thankfully, even in this day and age, we haven't all given up on rationality.

The universe around us displays far too much rationality for us to ever stop asking "why?", or to denigrate those who do

Hello Bernard,

My post 31 was phrased hurriedly, briefly and badly. You're right to be quite critical of it. While I did see some analogy in 'the studied object is already there, only its present workings can be studied, not its origin' you are of course absolutely right that that alone doesn't quite cut it. And I didn't take the time to look up the god and science thread again, it was only what I remembered from the top of my head. Apologies if I misrepresented your position.

Let me take more than the two sentences in my previous post to say more clearly what I meant.

I follow your reasoning of saying physics can't account for the presence of physics. It seems to make good sense. From a point of view based on the intuitions we get from looking at the world around us. What I meant to say is that that isn't necessarily what answers the question of the origin of the universe. See e.g. what you said in your follow-up post:

"The universe can't arise from physical processes because it INCLUDES all physical processes."

Really? There are some theories (pretty vague ones so far, like the multiverse hypothesis that our universe is not unique at all) that our universe may not be all there is. All pretty weird and very counter-intuitive ideas. But that doesn't necessarily make them wrong. Some of the physics that deals with matter in our own universe is every bit as weird. Intuition and ideas that at first seem very reasonable must sometimes yield. You may have read some of the links I posted to Graham about very weird physics. Before you'd read about them, you would have dismissed these ideas as being clearly impossible. Yet they're not.

So I don't think that the reasoning you outlined in posts 30 and 33 is adequate to say that the origin of our universe can't be explained from physics. Some of what you said, reasonable though it sounds, is already at odds with some theories currently being explored. If you want to maintain your position, then I would ask you to present something more extensive than posts 30 and 33, something that outweighs the basis of theories you are contradicting with those ideas. But you're in luck that those theories are so far still overwhelmingly speculative.:)

greets,
Peter

Peter;

thanks for a good reply. You'll not be surprised to hear that I still think you don't quite get it.

"The universe can't arise from physical processes because it INCLUDES all physical processes."

Really? There are some theories (pretty vague ones so far, like the multiverse hypothesis that our universe is not unique at all) that our universe may not be all there is"

Here I think you fail to grasp the extension of the question.

What do you mean by "universe"?

By "universe" I mean "all there is"

When you use the term "our universe" it's quite obvious that you don't quite mean this.

Now, I will leave aside all of the problems with a "multiverse". you admit that its entirely speculative, with no evidential base. I would go further and say that it is the most irrational type of answer to any question. "X is the case because EVERYTHING is the case sooner or later" seems to be to be the laziest type of speculation imaginable.

Still as you say, that doesn't mean it isn't true.

Now, say there were lots of "universes". Would they be governed by some form of physical processes?

If yes, then those other "universes" are also included in what I call "The Universe". They still contain physical laws which have to be explained, but can't explain themselves.

If no, then this other "universe" which does not work according to any physical, understandabale or potentially rational laws...in which case I think you're unwarranted to call it a universe.

Seems more like a "transcendent other" to me....you know, something beyond the laws of physics?

So, either way, and even if there are "multiverses" they still raise exactly the same questions.

So your hypothetical argument is no more than a matter of words.

By universe, I mean what you mean by multiverse, if true.

If there are lots of universes, either they're all in need of an outside explanation or ONE of them IS the outside explanation. In which case, it's not exactly a universe, but entirely transcendent and OTHER.

And just one more thing, Columbo.


"Some of what you said, reasonable though it sounds, is already at odds with some theories currently being explored"

How are these theories being explored?

How is there a physical investigation into the possibility of an infinity of non-physical universes.

Universe, multiverse, omniverse....whatever you call it, it doesn't explain its own existence.

Let me put it yet another way.

you say "the fact that there are physical laws may be explained by other physical laws".

I say that that's entirely irrational.

You say that "it may be irrational in this universe, but there may be an infinity of universes in which the fact that there are physical laws can be explained by other, unknown physical laws"

I say it still remains entirely irrational. Either these other universes are governed by physical laws, or they're not other universes.

In fact, if not governed by physical laws, what makes these other universes "universes"? How can there be "things" that are not governed by physical and - I'll add this - logical laws.

Seem to me that such a "universe" is beyond the realm of "things".

In fact, it seems to me all of a suddent that we're both actually thinking similarly.

I assert that the universe can't explain itself and revert to one thing outside the universe that can.

You agree that the universe can't explain itself, but assert that it may be explained by other universes, which, presumably, can explain themselves, and need not be part of the universe of physics and rationality that we know.

I say YES. But, given that they're outside the laws of physics and logic, I don't see how you're warranted in calling them universes.

The only thing you can say for sure is that they are not part of this universe, otherwise they couldn't explain it.

Which, in a neat twist of logic, brings us back to my point.

Whatever explains the universe must not itself be part of the universe.

Now, that is as far as I will go. you are making the leap of faith to posit other "universes". however, in doing so you're making claims beyond what you are entitled to make. you are extending your understanding of the universe to claim that whatever is beyond it is "something like it".

I am saying that whatever is beyond "this" universe - what you hypothesise to be a "multiverse" must neccessarily be totally Other.

The thing that is totally beyond the universe, and totally distinct from it, I call God.

Grokesx, for example, seems content not only to simply forget about the questions, but to denigrate anyone who continues asking the really interesting questions about reality. He is content simply to assume and never doubt the really hard questions.

Not so much forget and assume, but defer. In an earlier post you mentioned that framing questions in science as well as philosophy helps point one to answers that may suffice. This is true enough, but you go on to say:

Similarly, to ask, "why is there something rather than nothing?" is already to know that the answer can't lie in a physical process. After all, it's the physical process that we're asking about.

This is just thinking hard and making stuff up. Conceptually, with the state of our current knowledge, it is virtually impossible to get our heads around that question (without getting all godly and transcendent) and so one thing to do is aknowledge the fact and work towards improving our sum of knowledge in the hope that the question will become more amenable in the future. A happy by product of this is that on the way we learn to develop some really useful things - and a fair few horrible ones, too, it has to be said.

Going back to quantum physics gives us an example of what I am talking about. The discovery that small particles act in mindblowingly weird ways led to an explosion of philosophical interest in the new reality it exposed. Throughout the twentieth century philosophers and a fair few scientists tried their hardest to get their heads round the new reality. Many decades later, no two philosophers can agree what it all means and these days there is a morass of quantum woo-ology peddled by the likes of Deepak Chopra that is painful to behold.

In the mean time, those scientists who ignored the philosophy and concentrated on the "empirical" science created the electronics industry. Nowadays they are moving slowly towards the possible next big step in computing.

In a nice ironic twist, due to the efforts of those early pragmatists, there is more quantum woo-ology pinging around, thanks to the internet, than there ever would have been if they had stayed in lonely garrets and thunk a lot.

Mathematics exists, irrespective of the universe. Our universe is arguably a purely mathematical entity; TIME is a component of that. I keep suggesting to Will that he interviews Max Tegmark on this; Max has formalised the "Mathematical Universe Hypothesis", and I have to say I find it very persuasive.

The problem with pixies/gods is that they *don't* answer the question "why is there anything at all", because you're still left casting around for a reason for the pixie. Whatever you do, you end up with maths - not physics.

"Not so much forget and assume, but defer"

But you're ignoring what we already know about the question! that's not deferring, it's wilful ignorance!

""Similarly, to ask, "why is there something rather than nothing?" is already to know that the answer can't lie in a physical process. After all, it's the physical process that we're asking about.

This is just thinking hard and making stuff up."

Let me put it another way to see if you can grasp the logic.

It makes no sense to say "physical processes exist because of X physical process" as X physical process is included in what we're trying to explain.

Unless you can somehow explain that X physical process is a unique instance of an entirely self-sufficnet physical process - which you can't - this is just sheer nonsense.


The remainder of your posts simply seems to outline the many other useful and pragmatic things we could be doing if we didn't bother to think about the big questions.

That's fine...you go and do those useful things. But don't proclaim that it's irrational to come up with answers when you admit that you don't bother thinking about the question.

As you say, there are lots of other, useful things you could be doing with all the knowledge you have. You don't even need to ask the big questions. You can leave those to other people.

Helio;

What about if you ask for reasons for the maths?

You don't understand that positing God is not specifically positing a particular explanation for the universe. You are right to say that simply saying "God did it" doesn't explain anything.

Positing God is more akin to framing the question in such a way as to glimpse what might suffice as an answer.

We do not KNOW what lies beyond the universe. But, whatever it is must be different from the universe, and yet a source of it.

If the universe IS maths, what accounts for the holding together of a mathematical system such as the universe?

A space pixie certainly wouldn't, you're right. Nor would an ontological "mathematical reality", as such a thing is bound up in immanent rationality, only known to us through the working of the mind.

Maybe it makes sense to conceive of a meta-mid to ground all of those mathematical equations then. :)

"meta-mind" I mean

Hi Bernie,
No - mathematics is not dependent on a "meta-mind". A mind does not have to conceive of 2+2=4 for it to be "true". The universe is not ALL of mathematics (although arguably we may have access to the lot of it; after all, it's Turing-complete); it is a particular mathematical structure, like an instance of the Game of Life. Sure, mathematics is immanent, but you don't need a mind for that to be the case. God can't change Pi, remember? If there *is* a god, it is subject to maths; it doesn't make it - that would be perfectly illogical.

Anyone interested can look up Tegmark's paper - google Max Tegmark Mathematical Universe Hypothesis.

Helio;

"A mind does not have to conceive of 2+2=4 for it to be "true"."

How do you know?

anyway, I'm not quite arguing that a mind has to conceive of 2+2=4 for it to be true. I'm saying that 2+2=4 is, by it's nature, an intelligible content....the fact that 2+2=4 is an intelligibility already there, whether we conceive it or not, simply stresses my point that the universe is inherently intelligible...even hypothetical multiverses.

I think this immanent intelligibility demands an explanation that goes beyond the immanence. Some people think this doesn't raise any questions at all.

I'm not suggesting that that intelligible content of the universe proves that it is created by "a mind". If you remember, I merely offered it as a suggestion to counter your "mathematics creates itself" argument.


I'm saying that the universe being one big vast intelligible content is something which raises a question...a question, the nature of which, cannot be answered within this entire intelligible/perceptual matrix. Again, some people think it doesn't raise any questions at all.

But you're ignoring what we already know about the question! that's not deferring, it's wilful ignorance!

Robert M Pirsig said that the scientific method is good for testing the truth of what you think you know, and I think that applies here. There's nothing to stop anybody thinking about the really big questions, but unless they are pretty sure about what they think they know, their answers and the way they think about the questions are highly suspect.

You say, for eg;

We do not KNOW what lies beyond the universe. But, whatever it is must be different from the universe, and yet a source of it.

What evidence do you have for making that statement? Beyond our universe there may be concepts we do not have words for because we don't even know how to think about them properly. There might not even be a beyond, but if you want to wrap it all up and call it god, that's your perogative, I suppose.

"You say, for eg;

We do not KNOW what lies beyond the universe. But, whatever it is must be different from the universe, and yet a source of it.

What evidence do you have for making that statement?"


It's almost a statement of logical identity. All I am saying is that "whatever is not the universe is something other than the universe".

Do try to keep up.

"Beyond our universe there may be concepts we do not have words for because we don't even know how to think about them properly"

Indeed. Now, that would make such things OTHER than our niverse, right?

So we're agreed?

It's almost a statement of logical identity. All I am saying is that "whatever is not the universe is something other than the universe".

You are not speaking precisely. Your original statement assumes the fact that there is something beyond the universe and that it is the source of the universe. But you offer no evidence in support of the claim.

Er, Bernie, intelligibility does not imply a source *intelligence*. Indeed, if the MUH is correct (as I feel it is), and if Turing was correct about computation (as I feel he was, but smarter people than me might be able to thrash that one out a bit more), then *non*intelligibility would be the startlingly inconsistent thing.

I think it was Haldane (maybe not) who said that the universe is not only queerer than we imagine; it is queerer than we CAN imagine. I don't think that is true. Just the first bit.

Keep thinking. Keep testing.

Is there something beyond the Fibonacci sequence that is the source of the Fibonacci sequence? Does it need a "creator"? Or does it objectively "exist" in some hard-to-define way?

Is there something beyond the Fibonacci sequence that is the source of the Fibonacci sequence?

Rabbits.

You guys move fast despite pre-mod. Bernard, I have little time for anything more than a few drive-by posts today, and since what you wrote is the most promising opportunity for an interesting debate I've seen here for a while, it certainly deserves more than a drive-by. I will get back to it this weekend hopefully.

Grokesx:

"Your original statement assumes the fact that there is something beyond the universe and that it is the source of the universe."

No, i'm afraid you're not reading my replies to Helio.

The fact that the universe displays intelligibility implies, I think, a source of intelligibility. If that source is indeed the source of the universe, it must be something totally other than the universe, which, I have attempted to show, rules out a "multiverse", a "physical law" accounting for physical laws and a sky pixie with a magic wand.

IF the intelligibility that constitutes the universe has a source, that source is none of those things.

Helio:

"Bernie, intelligibility does not imply a source *intelligence*."

Please name one instance of intelligibility that doesn't imply an intellect?

Without an intellect to constitute it as intelligible, the universe is just a random series of impressions.

"Is there something beyond the Fibonacci sequence that is the source of the Fibonacci sequence?"

Let me rephrase;

Is there a Fibonacci sequence? Objectively? How do you know? From what is that sequence derived? What is a sequence without a concept of sequentialism?

Hi Bernie,
2+2=4. That is intelligible TO an intelligence, but it does not DEPEND on an intelligence to make it so. QED.

For instance, LSV might maintain that 2+2=5; it doesn't matter if that is his/her *opinion* - it is objectively incorrect, and it doesn't matter how stridently the error is asserted, or how "intelligent" we think the proposer is. It's just wrong. It is not dependent on *physical* laws, but on a deeper mathematical relationship.

The Fibonacci sequence depends on numbers and the relationship between numbers - that is ALL. Someone once said "god invented the integers" - that is clearly silly, but an amusing joke nonetheless, because it illustrates as well as anything that a "god" cannot be the ultimate layer of reality.

But the deeper issue is that if the universe *can* be conceived as a mathematical structure, this immediately explains its intelligibility to critters like us who have evolved brains and developed mathematical tools to delve into such things (hence my reference to Turing completeness).

Intelligences are systems; systems are based on mathematics, not the other way round. Even if there is a "god", she can't change Pi or e or the Fibonacci sequence, because she is dependent on mathematical truth. Or she doesn't exist. And the latter is the more likely option, of course, and the one which more and more Christians are realising is the case.

-H

Helio, i think your QED is a bit misplaced there. ;)

"For instance, LSV might maintain that 2+2=5; it doesn't matter if that is his/her *opinion* - it is objectively incorrect"

I agree.

As I've said before, I'm not some Bishop Berkely asserting that intelligibility doesn't exist unless there is an intelligence to understand it.

I'm rather asserting that the very notion of an intelligibility requires that there be an intellect capable of understanding it, whether it actually does or not.

Consider this. Suppose you claim that there is some intelligibility, some pattern, some sequence or law, but that, in principle, it could never be understood.

How is it intelligible.

So I'm pointing out that intelligibility is not really some totally free-standing thing. what constitutes intelligibility is "capacity to be understood".

Now, the obvious point is that "capacity to be understood" doesn't actually imply an "intellect which understands".

However, I think, at a universal level, when considering the absolute fundamental cause of there being ANY intelligibility, not just a particular instance, the only possible way of thinking beyond that is to posit some form of grounding intellect.

Again we're still wrapped up in the question about the origin of ANYTHING.

When asking, "why is there a universe" we imply with the question (if it is a valid question) something NOT the universe.

When considering that the universe that we're asking about is capable of being understood, we imply that that which is NOT the universe somehow the source of "capability of being understood"

What kind of thing, which is not actually a determinate thing of the universe, could be the source of all "capability of being understood"?

I don't know, but it might be something ANALOGOUS to a "mind", though without the mundane differentiations, divisions and limitations of the minds we know as part of the universe. But it's a useful analogy.

"The Fibonacci sequence depends on numbers and the relationship between numbers - that is ALL"

And I'm claiming that number and the relationship between them are, by nature, "capable of being understood". that's what "relationship" means.

I'm further suggesting that "why is there anything" is a valid question, and that the "capability of being understood" of that "anything" is.....suggestive.

I don't think it PROVES anything, let me make that clear.

"But the deeper issue is that if the universe *can* be conceived as a mathematical structure, this immediately explains its intelligibility to critters like us"

It does. But all you're saying there is that the universe is "intelligible to us" because it is intelligible (a mathematical structure).

I still say that that intelligibility raises a question.

I say that it is valid to ask "why is there anything?" and "why is the "anything" intelligible?"

I think the first question, if valid, implies something beyond the "anything" of the universe.

I think the second question, if valid, implies that whatever is beyond the universe is the source not only of the universe's existence but of its "capability of being understood".

Of course, you probably think that both are fake questions, that don't genuinely arise.

I fail to see how you can show this rationally.

I believe that it is possible, when faced with the universe, to say "It is just there, and that is all". That is a possible attitude to take. But I fail to see how it can be described as rational, or how it can ever possibly satisfy the curiosity of the intellect.

Hi Bernie,
It's a pity we are having this discussion on this thread. The fact that it is about a "Creationist leader" (figure that one out) somehow pollutes our friendly and constructive chat...

Anyway...
I think the second question, if valid, implies that whatever is beyond the universe is the source not only of the universe's existence but of its "capability of being understood".

Of course, you probably think that both are fake questions, that don't genuinely arise.

Well, I think the second one is correct, and is a real and important question, and gives us the answer. You wouldn't necessarily say that because something is edible, there must therefore be an eater. If something is visible, there is a viewer; if something is audible, there is necessarily a hearer. I know you don't say that intelligibility PROVES a source intelligence, and that's OK. I am suggesting that there is absolutely no need to even go there, as mathematics does the job "out of the box". It goes back to the concept of Turing completeness and "computability". It turns out that once you achieve a sort of mathematical critical ability, then *anything* that is computable (and hence ?comprehensible) comes into range.

So if the universe IS mathematical, then it is necessarily comprehensible (in principle; might take us a while to get there), but it is fallacious to suggest that this means there is an external intelligence *required* (or even "supported") for that to be the case. The conclusion (of an intelligence) bears no relationship to the source data (i.e. "intelligibility").

I believe that it is possible, when faced with the universe, to say "It is just there, and that is all". That is a possible attitude to take. But I fail to see how it can be described as rational, or how it can ever possibly satisfy the curiosity of the intellect.

Again, I completely agree. But mathematics is bigger than the universe, just as it is bigger than any one instantiation of Conway's Game of Life (another Turing-complete system, and, I would argue, a perfectly valid universe).

What I'm suggesting is that the MUH actually answers the question of why is there anything at all. If there were no universe (or "god"), there would still be a Fibonacci sequence; 2+2 would still be 4; Pi would be 3.14159[etc].

-H

"You wouldn't necessarily say that because something is edible, there must therefore be an eater"

Your forgetting universality though.

Ino order for something to be "edible" there MUST be an "eater" otherwise neither concept would have any meaning.

Whether that eater eats that particular edible thing isn't really the point.

In this case we're talking about the universe, and the very fact that "intelligible" and "intellect" can have any meaning at all.

"The conclusion (of an intelligence) bears no relationship to the source data (i.e. "intelligibility")."

I say it does....see above.

There could be no edible thing without there being "eaters". There can be no intelligibility without there being intellect.

"What I'm suggesting is that the MUH actually answers the question of why is there anything at all. If there were no universe (or "god"), there would still be a Fibonacci sequence; 2+2 would still be 4; Pi would be 3.14159[etc]."

Yes, but you haven't answered the question of why they're there.

If the universe is dependent on mathematics, I suggest that mathematics is dependent on intelligibility - I do not think that intelligibility is an instance of mathematics, but that mathematics is an instance of intelligibility. And I refer you back to the above on universal intelligibility.

I'll try it another, briefer way.

You seem to be suggesting that mathematics is self-sufficient. I think this is a mistaken view of the nature of intelligibility, of which mathematics is an instance.

That there is intelligibility seems to me not to be a self-sufficient fact. It seems to warrant an explanation.

Not only that, the very nature of intelligibility, the fact that it can be intelligible, seems to neccessarily imply that, in principle, it can be understood by an intellect.

Given the questions raised by intelligibility, questions which are themselves inherent in the intelligibility, and further given the nature of the existence of intelligibility as implying intellect, it seems reasonable to be open to the possibility of something like an intelligence that grasps and grounds intelligibility perse.

As I say, this is not a proof. I don't think there can be a proof of "the intelligible ground of all intelligibility". To attemnpt to PROVE something like that is inherently contradictory.

It is, howver, an attitiude to take, and a reasonable one.

And, lest I sound like Peter Rollins, it is not just an attitude. Many people find that it is an attitude that finds reciprocation, even if in a barely understood way.

Sorry, that wasn't so brief after all.

Bernie,
the very nature of intelligibility, the fact that it can be intelligible, seems to neccessarily imply that, in principle, it can be understood by an intellect.

Indeed, but that does not imply or support, in principle or otherwise, that an intellect needs to CREATE that process or ground it or drive it, which was the reason for my "edible" remark. Yes, of course, along we come, and we have evolved intellects, and we find that we can use those intellects in this arena; similarly, we can eat that edible thingy, but it is simply a fallacy to suggest that intelligibility requires *grounding* in an intellect.

I appreciate that you *feel* that this is the case, but my point remains that that is just your feeling - you can't make a case for it.

Not that that is a bad thing per se; as I mentioned before, gods can't change Pi - mathematics (and by virtue of that, "intelligibility", because I think we are in the same territory here) is Properly Fundamental; minds/intellects/systems/relationships always lie on top of that layer, not below.

See what I'm getting at?

I could expand with a little thought experiment, but better go and pick up my little godless kids first :-)

-H

"the very nature of intelligibility, the fact that it can be intelligible, seems to neccessarily imply that, in principle, it can be understood by an intellect.

Indeed, but that does not imply or support, in principle or otherwise, that an intellect needs to CREATE that process or ground it or drive it, which was the reason for my "edible" remark."


Look, the "edibility of a thing" NEEDS an eater. For the thing to exist as edible there must exist eaters. Granted that the edible thing itself doesn't need an eater to exist, to exist "as edible" it does need an eater. If there were no such things as eaters and eating, it would not be edible.

Now, I'm claiming that "to exist as intelligible" just means "to exist". I am claiming that to be intelligible is to exist.

So, if the existence of intelligibility implies an intellect, needs an intelect to exist "as intelligible" I am suggesting that that is the sufficient cause of it to exist at all. If there were no such thing as an intellect, the universe would not exist as intelligible. I am saying that to exist as intelligible is the same thing as "to exist".

What do we mean when we say that something "exists"? We mean that a certain, intelligible state of affairs is actually the case. Can we say of a complete unintelligibility that it exists? What can we say of it?

Helio, you seem to be driving at some sort of universal pan-intelligibility within which everything else inheres.

You're getting quite Hegelian there, or Spinozist.

Still, you also seem to be agreeing with me that there is a "properly fundamental" intelligibility that underlies all minds/intellects/systems/relationships.

For some reason you call that "mathematics", even though it lies beyond all minds, systems and relationships. Seems more like some unique and transcendent Other to me.

I am reading you right, aren't I? Let me just quote;

"mathematics (and by virtue of that, "intelligibility", because I think we are in the same territory here) is Properly Fundamental; minds/intellects/systems/relationships always lie on top of that layer, not below"

See, if we're talking about what underlies minds/intellects/systems/relationships, I don't see how we can describe it as mathematics or intelligibility, which both consists of and inhere within relationships.

Seems to me like you shold really be talking about what is really fundamental to all of those relationships.

No, i'm afraid you're not reading my replies to Helio.

Well, about as carefully as you are reading my posts, mainly because you are arguing theologically. You have an answer that you would love to be true and are steering a logical course to arrive there. You like to address the big questions, but it is the somewhat smaller ones that lead to the most meaningful answers. I'll make another attempt, since you don't seem to understand the phrase "happy by-product", at explaining what I mean by illustration.

In the three hundred years of hard thinking since Leibniz addressed the something rather than nothing conundrum (I'm not knocking him BTW, the man's a legend) the Stanford Dictionary of Philosophy comes no closer to an answer than its first line, "Well, why not?" In the same period another sort of thinking (incorporating many things presaged in some of Leibniz's own work) has managed to work out a well supported model of the very beginnings of the universe (I'm using the more usually accepted definition here, not the one you made up for your arguments). We now know, from the accumulated, "empirical" knowledge of "particular branch(es) of empirical science" what went on up to a tiny fraction of a second before the Big Bang.

Now, of course, the next really interesting part will come when we can get to grips with that fraction of a second, but for that we need a to further our understanding by unifying quantum theory and general relativity. Chances are it will involve concepts that will challenge what we think we already know. Some of the concepts in the candidate theories certainly do. When it happens, we may, or may not, be better equipped to make a stab at the big questions. It's a slow process, but it is the only way we'll even glimpse the answers, and it's all thanks to lots of very clever people with abiding passions for "particular branch(es) of empirical science".

Hi Bernie,

Seems to me like you shold really be talking about what is really fundamental to all of those relationships.

Yes - mathematics. Maths does not INHERE in the relationships; maths DESCRIBES the relationships.

Cheers,
-H

Grokesx

Again the gist of your argument seems to be that, as empirical science has been so successful at answering questions about the content of the universe, it will sooner or later be successful at answering questions about the existence of the world.

I have attempted to show that this is impossible in principle. So even your knowledge of the milli-second after the Big Bang tells us nothing about the cause of the Big Bang, and never will.

Helio;

It seems to me that all you're doing is reducing intelligibility to mathematics. While I don't quite agree with you, it makes no impact on the argument I'm trying to make.

Mathematics, if buy that you mean the intelligible structures governing everything that exists, itself raises a fundamental question.

The rationality of mathematics does not seem to be to be self-sufficient.

Bernie, of course it is self-sufficient. Yes, I am reducing intelligibility to mathematics, and I have pointed out that mathematical "truths" can be said to "exist" without the need for any underpinning. Maths is basal. Pi is Pi, whether there are gods or not.

Now, you're saying that it (the "rationality of mathematics" - that is just mathematics itself, really!) doesn't "seem to be self-sufficient" - I have no idea what you mean by that. Can you please clarify?

Helio;

I've been attempting to throughout the whoel thread, but i think we've gone a bit tangential. That you call "mathematics" what I call "intelligibility" doesn't seem to make a difference to the argument I have been making

Let me return to your "edible" analogy. For something to be "edible" doesn't imply that it is actually eaten...but it does imply that there are things in the universe that eat, and that this thing can be eaten by one of those things.

Nothing is "self-sufficiently edible". If it existed on its own, with no such thing as an eater, it would not be edible. It needs the existence in principle of an eater in order to be edible.

Similarly, I am suggesting that nothing can be self-sufficiently "intelligible". If it existed on its own, with no such thing as an intellect, it would not be intelligibile, even in principle. The universe needs the existence of intellect in principle to be constitued as intelligible.

Sorry i must be so brief, but I hope this explains what i mean when I say intelligibility doesn't seem to be self-sufficient. The very nature of intelligibility suggests otherwise, just as the nature of "edible" does also.

Hello Bernard,

Sorry I took longer to reply than I said I would.

I've just read through this entire thread from about post 29 onwards. I'm afraid this is not going to another lengthy 'god and science' thread.

First some rather unimportant nags. I think you apply a somewhat non-standard use of the word 'universe'. And in post 44 you attribute quite a few statements to me I didn't make. But you said tha earlier on I did something similar to you. Nowhere near as much has you did, but I'm fine with calling it even on that front.:)

Then on to more interesting things. I'm afraid this whole thread hasn't changed my mind very much. Let me start by repeating that your reasoning of 'a physical process can't explain the presence of there being physical processes in the first place' doesn't seem bad to me. But I will also repeat that your reasoning, reasonable as it seems, is an extremely flimsy basis for making a very far-reaching statement like 'physics will never explain the origins of the universe'. I think Helio once said something like

philosophy is fine and can lead to very interesting results, but without verification it is possible to take a wrong turn, reason very far in the wrong direction from there, and never realize it.

Indeed. I don't see any obvious big holes in that particular bit of reasoning that started this. It may prove right. But then it may not. I'll go along with what grokesx said in post 45, let's try to understand things better first. As long as our understanding of things is progressing I see little reason to declare we'll never understand it. Who knows, maybe we will come to the more certain conclusion that we can't understand the coming about of our universe. Or maybe we'll figure it out. In case we don't, and we can only say 'this is how it works, no idea how it got there', then I'll agree with you that that would not be intellectually satisfying. But then I don't think anything that you have called 'other', 'transcendent', etc in this entire thread helps us understand things much better.

greets,
Peter

Again the gist of your argument seems to be that, as empirical science has been so successful at answering questions about the content of the universe, it will sooner or later be successful at answering questions about the existence of the world.

Nooo. But as Peter says, it offers the hope. Without it we are left with the transcendent other and gods of gaps.

I have attempted to show that this is impossible in principle. So even your knowledge of the milli-second after the Big Bang tells us nothing about the cause of the Big Bang, and never will.

Never say never, Bernie. Never say never.

But neither of you have yet addressed the arguments I made suggesting that it is impossible in principle!

This is beginning to remind me of Anthony Flew and falsification. What would possibly convince you that physics CAN'T explain the origin of physics in principle?

"Let me start by repeating that your reasoning of 'a physical process can't explain the presence of there being physical processes in the first place' doesn't seem bad to me. But I will also repeat that your reasoning, reasonable as it seems, is an extremely flimsy basis for making a very far-reaching statement like 'physics will never explain the origins of the universe'."

Aren't they pretty much just claiming the same thing though?

If you agree that physical processes can't cause there being physical processes in general, surely the science that explains physical processes can't explain the existence in general of those processes. Surely that second claim is no more than a logical corrolary of the first!

"philosophy is fine and can lead to very interesting results, but without verification it is possible to take a wrong turn, reason very far in the wrong direction from there, and never realize it."

I can agree with that. But there is a difference between engaging in apparently reasonable, but purely speculative, inquiry and attempting to frame the nature of inquiry based on the nature of intelligibility itself.

This is not speculative - it is firmly grounded in the way in which humans understand.

Sure, I can't prove that physical processes will never provide the explanation of why there are physical processes. How does one prove a category mistake?

Imagine I wanted to claim that one day we might be able to understand how humanity began to exist by counting the number of humans there are.

Now, do you think that's possible? How can a physical description of the number of humans that exist ever tell us how those humans began to exist?

Of course, it can't, but how is it possible to prove it can't to one who is determined to believe that it might? Surely there is something inherent in the nature of the nature "how many humans are there" which rules out the answer being able to tell us anything about origins.

Similarly, the questions asked in physics relating to how physical processes work, and what constitutes those processes, can never in principle tell us how those processes work. That is implict in the type of question being asked.

Great, that's what I get for typing in haste.

The sixth line from the top should read "...something inherent in the nature of the question...", not "the nature of the nature"

The first word of the last line should read "came into existence" rather than "work".

Cheers

But neither of you have yet addressed the arguments I made suggesting that it is impossible in principle!

In our different ways we both have. Peter nailed the crux of it in 41:

I follow your reasoning of saying physics can't account for the presence of physics. It seems to make good sense. From a point of view based on the intuitions we get from looking at the world around us.

That's why I say never say never. Science sees more of the universe around us every day and so our intuitions about it change. Simples.

Hello Bernard,

Sorry, but I think posts 75 and 76 were poor ones. In 75 there are repeats of bits you said before. And then it seems you're saying 'My reasoning can't be wrong!' when you something like

"This is not speculative - it is firmly grounded in the way in which humans understand. "

or

"But there is a difference between engaging in apparently reasonable, but purely speculative, inquiry and attempting to frame the nature of inquiry based on the nature of intelligibility itself."

Ah, so you are 100% sure that your understanding (see that bit that grokesx quoted in bold) can't possibly be overlooking something. Sure Bernie, sure.

And post 76 is a really bad straw man analogy.

Try to get your head around it Bernie, what you say sounds reasonable, but it's nowhere near good enough to accept for sure a far-reaching statement like 'science will NEVER figure it out'. And including some exclamation marks in your post 75 will make it sound louder, but not more convincing.

Grokesx:

I don't know what intuitions you're talking about, but I'm talking about logic.

It is a logical fact that counting the number of humans will never explain how humans came to exist. that is a logical fact, not based on intuition, but on the intelligible nature of the question asked.

Similarly, any physical science which describes and explains physical processes cannot explain the existence of physical processes in general. That is a logical fact based on the question asked. Physics presumes physical processes. It is dependant on them.

Perhaps you think that, at some point in the future physics will begin to lok beyond the phsical proceeses to try to glimpse their origins.

If it ever does, it will no longer be physics, but metaphysics. And, in the nature of looking beyond physical processes, whatever is "beyond" is obviously not open to physical verification. Otherwise it wouldn't be beyond.

Again, these are logical implications deriving from the nature of physics. If physics changes so that it speculates on "what is beyond physics", maybe it will no longer be physics. Certainly, if it no longer deals solely with description and systematisation of physical processes it won't be the physics that we know.


Or perhaps you're sugesting that the logical implications that I have outlined may change. Maybe logic iself is unreliable, and subject to change.

If that is the case, i can only asume that it makes no sense to talk of true or false, as the rules governing them could change arbitrarily. In which case, neither of us is right or wrong, and both of our scenarios both are and are not the case.

But I don't thnk this is true. I think logic stays the same, as does truth. It is both inherently logical and actually true that a scientific system that describes and systematises physical processes cannot explain there being physical processes. Unless you're willing to admit that logic is unreliable, and that therefore ALL of our thinking is suspect, this is an inescapable logical conclusion.

You say you "never say never", but of course, you do say "never" to some things. Science would not be science if it "never said never" to anything. Some things are thought to be sufficiently logically impossible to be totally discounted in any proposed scientific explanation or hypothesis. Science does, of course, accept the limits of the logically possible, otherwise no experiment could be expected to achieve any particular result at any given time. Anything could just randomly happen at any time.

Now, you could ignore logic altogether, truly "never say never", and forget the nature of the question you're asking. You could assert quite forcefully that counting the number of humans will one day tell us how humans came to exist. you can even really really hope that it will.

But it wont. And when you reach the end of your life and it still hasn't, mabe then you'll realise that it wont. Until then I'm not sure I can prove the applicability of logic, or the intelligibility of narrowing the answer to a question.

If your default position is "Well, anthing MIGHT happen, I'm not sure how to have an intelligent debate with you.

ANYTHING might happen. The world might turn upside down. Logic might stop working. Language might become meaningless. But we live, work, speak and debate in the assumption that logic does work, and that particular questions ask for particular answers.

Post 80 is a response to Grokesx, but I think it adequately answers PeterK as well.

Logical relationships CAN be held to be indubitable. If you're sugesting that they may change, then neither of us is right or wrong, as anything could arbitrarily change.

It is a logical corrolary of the nature of physics that it can't move beyond the physical phenomena, and therefore can't account for there being physical phenomena, just as a study of the number of humans can't acount for there being humans.

Above you say that I say "Science will never figure it out". I'm not sure if this is a direct quote or not, but I have atempted to always speak of "physical sciences". Only "physical sciences" are affected by the ogical implication outlied above.

If I said that "science" can never figure it out, that was a slight mistake, as I think metaphysics is a science, and can ask the questions about what accounts for there being physics.

So apologies if I wasn't consistently speaking of "the physical sciences".

Bernard, I did mean physical science not metaphysics, I'm not saying that logic itself will be overturned, etc. I don't think grokesx was saying anything like that either. What I am saying is the observations and insights you apply that logic to may be far from complete. I don't think the results of applying fine (even indubitable) reasoning to a possibly very incomplete picture are reliable enough to claim the absolute certainty you claim. For the moment I'd go along with your reasoning and say I can't see how science would explain the universe coming about. But I don't think you or anyone can say that will still be the situation 500 years from now.

Your latest two posts do read to me like yet another way of you outlining somewhat similar reasoning as in your earlier posts and then again saying 'That can't be wrong'. I think we're going around in circles, aren't we?

Apart from that I'll repeat my suggestion to drop the rather bad straw man analogy about counting people. I don't think it was very good the first time you posted it.

Bernard

I was going to go off on one about logic and science and stuff, but this bloke here does it far better than I can.

Peter;

A number of things occur to me.

I'm not sure we mean the same thing by "physical science". My idea of "physical science" is a science that systematises the relations and functions between what are defined as material objects (whatever "material" turns out to mean).

Now, I'm suggesting that a science that deals with the relations between already existing things cannot extend its method to deal with the cause of the existence of those things. That takes a new type of question.

You seem to agree with that, with the caveat that that may change 500 years from now.

I'm suggesting that, if it does change 500 years from now, and science begins to ask questions about how the universe came about, it has no grounds to restrict itself to "physics".

If you're suggesting that, 500 years from, now, we may be able to ask scientific-type questions about the origin of the universe, I agree.

I'm suggesting that, given this new paradigm of thinking, you have no grounds for insisting that it still deals only with physical matter and the relations and functions between it.

So, let's say we both agree that scientific thinking may well change and begin to ask the questions that it cannot ask presently. My point is that, given that change, you have no grounds for continuing to restrict this new science to physical matter.

It's the very restriction to the relations between physical matter that means science is currently unable to ask about the origin of the universe.

If "science-thinking" does become able to ask those questions, I see no grounds for assuming it will be what we now know as "physical science".

In fact, given science in general's tendency to become more speculative on the nature of matter, i would imagine that a new paradigm in science would be more interested in the existence per se of such multiple phenomena as dark matter, quantum functions and wave spectrums, and that the idea of empirical verification that you're clinging to will be completely outdated. At that stage, physics will have become more akin to metaphysics, though more detailed and conceptually fine-tuned.

Finally, I think we may have got bogged down in discussing the limits or otherwise of science. the real question is not "what kind of science can tell us about the origin of the universe" but "what is the source of the origin of the universe"

As I define the universe as all that physically an intelligibly exists, and as all the physically and intelligibly exists inherently raises a further question about its existence, I still assert that whatever is the source of that beginning to exist must lie outside of that which began to exist.

Bernard

Firstly we should define some terms. Physical science is merely a term for those branches of natural science that deal with non living systems. Natural science is a catch all term for the naturalistic study of the universe and is nearer to your concept of physical science. Natural science uses the scientific method to study the natural world as distinct from the social sciences that use the scientific method to study people and the formal sciences that rely on maths and logic and which has only limited applicability to the real world. Metaphysics deals in areas beyond current knowledge that cannot be tested.

Gotta go now, but hopefully I will continue later.

Back again.

So, the important thing in this discussion about science is the method and how it works rather than worrying about what it studies and what matter is etc. I gave a brief outline to the best of my ability in 16 and there is further discussion if you follow the link in 83.

The key is that science comes up with new knowledge by the interplay between inductive and deductive reasoning, testing and experiment, seasoned with maths and a dash of inspiration. Alone, each of the elements can't deliver, but together they enable scientists to come up with models of reality that serve us well until something better comes along.

It is necessarily a slow process, because unlike philosophers, scientists have to be careful not to extrapolate too far from what can be tested. Theories have to be well supported by evidence. When they are not, they run into trouble and founder, at least until ways of testing can be developed. String theory, by some accounts, falls into this category.

Hopefully, you can see the problem a scientifically minded person has with:

In fact, given science in general's tendency to become more speculative on the nature of matter, i would imagine that a new paradigm in science would be more interested in the existence per se of such multiple phenomena as dark matter, quantum functions and wave spectrums, and that the idea of empirical verification that you're clinging to will be completely outdated. At that stage, physics will have become more akin to metaphysics, though more detailed and conceptually fine-tuned.

The tendency in science is not towards speculation, but towards greater difficulty, complexity and towards more counter intuitive concepts, simply because the easy stuff has been done. To say that "empirical verification will be completely outdated" is to misunderstand what science is all about. Quantum theory is as difficult and counter intuitive as it gets, but it is also probably the most well supported scientific theory around. Whatever the new paradigms are, if they stray from evidence, testing and falsification, they won't be science.

Finally, I think we may have got bogged down in discussing the limits or otherwise of science. the real question is not "what kind of science can tell us about the origin of the universe" but "what is the source of the origin of the universe"

The question for me all along has been, "what is most likely to get us closer to knowledge of the origin of the universe." My money is still on science.

Grokesx;

First, I disagree with this.

"Metaphysics deals in areas beyond current knowledge that cannot be tested."

Why can metaphysics not be tested? Surely, like any other branch of inquiry, it can come up with hypotheses, which can then be tested to fit, or not fit the evidence,

Take the proposition "the universe was caused by something not the universe."

As scientists are so keen to point out in other scenarios, the hypothesis is repeatedly tested against the evidence, and if there continues to be no falsification, we are as sure as we can be.

Given that we know of nothing in the world to be the cause of itself, it is a reasonable hypothesis to suggest that the universe as a whole is not the cause of itself. If we were to discover something that created itself ex nihilo, we'd have grounds for revising that hypothesis. Until then, we can treat it as true. Like evolution, for example.

"So, the important thing in this discussion about science is the method and how it works rather than worrying about what it studies and what matter is etc"

Ya see, I think those are important questions, and can reasonably be asked. And, using metaphysics, we can propose reasonable hypotheses that can then be tested. Perhaps another difference between "natural science" if you like, and metaphysics is that both consider different questions to be important. If you don't think these questions are important, that's fair enough. Don't ask them.

"The key is that science comes up with new knowledge by the interplay between inductive and deductive reasoning, testing and experiment, seasoned with maths and a dash of inspiration. Alone, each of the elements can't deliver, but together they enable scientists to come up with models of reality that serve us well until something better comes along."

OK.

All of your arguments about science's reliance on verification is all well and good, but you don't seem to apply that scientific thinking to this;

"The question for me all along has been, "what is most likely to get us closer to knowledge of the origin of the universe." My money is still on science."

It is counterintuitive to suggest that science, which relies on physical verification, will ever be able to find any evidence for what caused "physical things". It can't move beyond physical things because it demands physical verification, therefore it can't answer questions which do not presuppose the existence of physical things.

Metaphysics does not neccessarily rely on physical, empirical verification. Some of its hypotheses rely entirely on logical implication and deduction.

In this way, and if the question is "can metaphysics be as universally agreed as physical science?", then I agree with you that it can't. Logic and deduction are fickle, and there will always be arguments and misunderstandings about what counts as evidence.

So I agree that metaphysics can never achieve the universally agreed certainty of the physical sciences. Its subject matter, and the only method available for dealing with such subject matter, does not allow it.

But its conclusions are no less rational, reasonable and open to assent for that. Although we can never achieve the certainty that comes from empirical verification, the questions asked by metaphysics are still worth asking, and the proposed answers are still worth considering and weighing against your own intelligble experience of being. That is the evidence, although it can be interpreted in different ways.

Hello Bernard, post 84,

You're suggesting that science may change and then become able to address the questions of where physical process we observe come from, rather than just explain how they work. That's a bit different from what I meant, I meant explaining origins working within the current methodology. But as I'm not sure what you mean by that 'different science' and it seems like a bit of a diversion, we may agree to leave that one?

You then go on to say

"In fact, given science in general's tendency to become more speculative on the nature of matter, i would imagine that a new paradigm in science would be more interested in the existence per se of such multiple phenomena as dark matter, quantum functions and wave spectrums, and that the idea of empirical verification that you're clinging to will be completely outdated. At that stage, physics will have become more akin to metaphysics, though more detailed and conceptually fine-tuned."

More speculative? Empirical verification becoming outdated? Things at the cutting edge of fundamental science may be becoming more and more counter-intuitive, but empirical verification isn't about to become obsolete. The very existence of for instance the dark matter you mention is hypothesized in part due to observations concerning light (how it sometimes bends in a different way than what is predicted if you account for all known factors that make it bend).
And what exactly do you mean by quantum functions and wave spectrums? Fancy terms, but I somehow suspect you're threading into areas where you don't know 100% what you're talking about. I could be wrong in thinking that of course. So perhaps you could elaborate please?

And then the last paragraph of what you wrote means we are going around in circles. You state your reasoning, but you do not bring any new insight into the discussion. That means I feel the same about the end of post 84 as I do about previous posts. Again, it's reasoning that seems ok to me, but it's reasoning based on the same limited knowledge as before. And therefore I again think it presents a far too limited basis for saying with full certainty that science will never figure it out (please note that I think that there is some chance you may be right! Just not the 100% certainty as you think.). And I strongly suspect that next posts would continue that pattern.

greets,
Peter

Hello grokesx,

"Firstly we should define some terms. Physical science is merely a term for those branches of natural science that deal with non living systems. Natural science is a catch all term for the naturalistic study of the universe and is nearer to your concept of physical science."

Definition questions aren't the best ones, since it is just about that, definitions. But I always used the words physical science for what you refer to as natural science. For instance, computational modeling of protein folding, using electronic structure methods, would you say that that is an area of physical science? I would.

I should have read post 86 before posting my reply in post 88, I see I was repeating much of what grokesx already said. But since post 87 is at present the latest post past moderation, I guess I can jump in on that one before grokesx.

Bernard, you go in off I think when you write



"Take the proposition "the universe was caused by something not the universe."

As scientists are so keen to point out in other scenarios, the hypothesis is repeatedly tested against the evidence, and if there continues to be no falsification, we are as sure as we can be.

Given that we know of nothing in the world to be the cause of itself, it is a reasonable hypothesis to suggest that the universe as a whole is not the cause of itself. If we were to discover something that created itself ex nihilo, we'd have grounds for revising that hypothesis. Until then, we can treat it as true. Like evolution, for example."



You mention a proposition and say there is no evidence against it. Fine, I fully agree. I disagree with the bit 'the hypothesis is repeatedly tested against the evidence'. What evidence? What is your positive evidence in favour of that proposition? If you read Bertrand Russels galactic tea pot analogy or the Gospel of the Flying Spaghetti Monster, you'll find that they are constructed in such a way that you can't easily say 'this or that is at odds with what they say'. But lack of counter evidence doesn't make them true. You put you proposition on the same level as evolution. Wrong, very wrong. Evolution has tons of positive evidence speaking in favour of it. You seem to want to present something in support of your proposition when you mention that we never see things popping into existence out of nowhere. But that is not positive evidence in favour of your proposition, it is merely the absence of counter-evidence.

For instance, computational modeling of protein folding, using electronic structure methods, would you say that that is an area of physical science? I would.

I know you realise I was just trying to clarify things a bit for Bernard, and so I used the general academic distinctions. For eg Imperial College London's faculty of natural science includes chemistry, physics, the life sciences and, interestingly, maths.

As for computer modeling of protein folding, that's just Greek to me.

Sorry folks - I've been busy, and have lost this thread a wee bit. Let's back up a tad. We don't need an external CAUSE for the universe, because if it's a cause, that necessarily implies time (or a time-like process), which implies change, which means it cannae be fundamental, so we're looking not for a CAUSE, but for an EXPLANATION. That explanation needs to be timeless (of course), fundamental (of course), and non-contingent (maybe I've just tautologised things). So a god can't do it, otherwise the universe as a structure would be coeval with its "causer"; there is no "change factor" that a god can apply.

So do we have another potential explanation? Yes - mathematics. Indeed, that's the only potential explanation, surely?

Bernard,

What Peter said in 90.

Perhaps another difference between "natural science" if you like, and metaphysics is that both consider different questions to be important. If you don't think these questions are important, that's fair enough. Don't ask them.

No, no, a thousand times no. They think exactly the same questions are important, but go about answering them in different says. Most of my posts have been attempting - pretty badly, apparently - to suggest that if the fundamental questions are to be answered (which as Peter says is a mighty big if), science is a better candidate than logic, philosophy, metaphysics etc, not to mention the many elephants kicking around in this particular room: theology, scriptures, mysticism and all the other examples of magical thinking that human beings are prone to.

Without go over it all again, I shall just emphasise the key distinction - that of extrapolation. Science is careful not to over extrapolate, philosophy and metaphysics have no compunction in doing so. Science addresses the questions that can be answered, so that the in the future more questions can be asked with a reasonable expectation of obtaining an answer. Metaphysics speculates and logic shuffles the pack of what we already know. Science may get there in the end. If metaphysics does it will be by accident or by hanging on the coat tails of science.

If I were to use an analogy, it would be of attempting to reach the summit of Everest from the base camp. Metaphysics keeps jumping up to get a better view of the top. Science climbs, hitting many difficulties along the way. Sometimes it comes to a dead halt while it improves its equipment. Logic examines the climbed area, frequently going back to bottom to see if there's something of interest science has missed on the way.

It is counterintuitive to suggest that science, which relies on physical verification, will ever be able to find any evidence for what caused "physical things".

We've been here before. Counter-intuitiveness isn't an indicator of reality. The closer science gets to reality, the more counter-intuitive it is going to be become.

Heliopolitan

I think I'll go with the reply that, with hindsight, I should probably have used with Bernard: It's too early to say.

Helio

How on earth can an abstract truth cause anything?! By definition it cannot enter into causal relationships. That's why it's called abstract.

Even Plato needed a Demiurge.

I'm going to butt out again, lest the ad hominems flow. But apparently science doesn't need metaphysics. Just really bad pop-metaphysics.

Graham

Graham, Graham, Graham,
Pfffrrr! pseudo-philosophical tosh, I love to see a bit inferiority complex shining through , you are the king of the already often-reiterated emptypostulate, so I'll just continue my laughing, FlyingSpaghettiMonsters,prrft!!!....

etc etc

There, I saved PK the bother.
You can go back to your discussion.

Fellows, just a quick reply, as I'm a little short on time. Sorry if I don't reply to all points.

Peter;


"You mention a proposition (the universe is caused by something not the universe) and say there is no evidence against it. Fine, I fully agree. I disagree with the bit 'the hypothesis is repeatedly tested against the evidence'. What evidence"

The evidence is the fact that everything in the universe is caused by something else. Perhaps you're disputimng this?

"You seem to want to present something in support of your proposition when you mention that we never see things popping into existence out of nowhere. But that is not positive evidence in favour of your proposition, it is merely the absence of counter-evidence"

Perhaps that should be reversed. the evidence is not that "we never see things popping into existence out of nowhere" but that "everything we know of DOES NOT pop into existence out of nowhere". It is positive evidence based on everything we know about anything else.

Helio;


"We don't need an external CAUSE for the universe, because if it's a cause, that necessarily implies time (or a time-like process), which implies change, which means it cannae be fundamental, so we're looking not for a CAUSE, but for an EXPLANATION."

Fair enough. technically this is true, but the word "cause" can be used analogically to refer to different types of "explanation". So I think it is reasonable to say that the explanation of the universe is "something like a cause" - i.e., the reason for the being of a thing, but that it cannot be thought of as a physical or temporal cause. I still think the word has useful reference in this case, although analogically.

"So a god can't do it, otherwise the universe as a structure would be coeval with its "causer"; there is no "change factor" that a god can apply."

Here I'm not altogether sure what you mean. i think you may be suggesting that a fundamental, non-contingent God cannot be responsible for change. This is only true if "fundamental" and "neccessary" means "static". I think we have reasonable grounds to suggest that the opposite is the case - that what is fundamental and neccessary if infinite ACT, the participation in which is the source of ALL development, change and progression into fuller existence.

I've spoke about mathematics and intelligibility before.

Grokesx, all I can say is that you seem to have a mistaken view of metaphysics - or perhaps an understandable view of some systems of metaphysics, but not all. Many metaphysical systems - Kant's for example - push the resistance to extrapolation further than any method of physical science ever has, and doubts absolutely everything that can be doubted. Given that, though, there are still some fundamental bases on which logic and intellect can proceed.

Ooooh, I wonder what Graham has said while I typed that....?

The suspense is killing me!

Bernard

Will you be IPS Sat?

Hmmm, I haven't had an invite...I've been a little out of touch for the last couple of years.

Where and when...and what? I would quite like to show my face.